On the side of the angels and the fall of Joe McCarthy

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The history of the Army-McCarthy affair is reviewed with an emphasis placed upon the Eisenhower administration’s unofficial response to allegations made by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy about the threat posed by communist infiltration at Fort Monmouth, NJ. In 1973, the late author, Robert V. Steele, writing under the pseudonym Lately Thomas, published When Even Angels Wept, analyzing the career of the late Wisconsin Senator. Steele stressed that McCarthy was “not amendable to moral laws because he recognize[d] none.” To defeat McCarthy required considerable political skill and immeasurable political courage, not just for the President, but for the men assigned the task. Fred Greenstein, a former Professor of Political Science at Princeton University, claimed that President Dwight Eisenhower followed what Greenstein termed “the hidden-hand approach” to presidential leadership to resolve the McCarthy problem. This paper tested Greenstein’s thesis and discovered Greenstein was correct, but he superficially chronicled the methods employed by the President during McCarthy’s attacks on the U.S. Army from 1953 through 1954. Eisenhower’s political lieutenants, in order to achieve Eisenhower’s aim, employed questionable methods to achieve the President’s objective, while staying on the side of angels in the process. Relying on Fred Seaton’s papers, particularly Seaton’s “the Eyes Only Series;” the “DDE Diary Series;” the White House’s telephone call files; and many other records available at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, it is possible to retrace what President Eisenhower knew and when he knew it. Additional research into congressional and senatorial abuses of power, particularly in the late 1940s, will be required to fully understand the influence McCarthy gained by his first attack on the U.S. Army during the Senate investigation of the Malmedy Massacre in late 1949.

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A TRIP TO WHEELING, WEST VIRGINIA

On February 9, 1950, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy began a five-state Lincoln Day tour, a trek common to all Republican politicians. His first stop was Wheeling, West Virginia, for the Ohio County Women’s Republican Club. In his briefcase, McCarthy had two drafts ready to deliver. One involved the housing crisis, and the second addressed communists in government, a more relevant topic in light of the recent conviction of former State Department official Alger Hiss. However, no one could have anticipated what followed when McCarthy told the audience: “I have here in my hand a list of 205 members of the Communist Party still working and shaping policy in the State Department.” During the previous month, McCarthy had attacked Secretary of State Dean Acheson for defending Hiss following his conviction for perjury. McCarthy’s accusations caused a firestorm in Washington for the Truman administration and among the Democratic leadership in the Senate. One year later, McCarthy came to Kansas for another Lincoln Day event on January 29, 1951, and made similar accusations concerning Dean Acheson whom he claimed held a “an almost Svengali[-like] influence over Truman.”

McCarthy’s success came from the Hiss conviction combined with his ability tap into the public’s fears following the fall of China to communism and the Soviet detonation of an atomic weapon in 1949. The British arrest of Klaus Fuchs, a German émigré nuclear physicist who had worked on the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, caused additional anxiety for many Americans. When Fuchs confessed, it started a general round-up of other Soviet operatives, including Harry Gold, a Soviet courier linked to Julius Rosenberg, which led to the eventual trial of both Julius and his wife Ethel for espionage. The Rosenberg trial and execution heightened the public’s fear of Soviet spies stealing American secrets and jeopardizing American national security. For many Americans, Joe McCarthy seemed the only politician willing to root out the traitors in Washington.

Nearly three months before his famous Wheeling address on February 9, 1950, McCarthy had a strange visitor come to his door with evidence of communist subversion within the United States government. The guest was attracted to McCarthy’s handing of the World War II Malmedy massacre investigation in March 1949, and especially his defense of the SS personnel responsible for the crime. The visitor was Carter Weldon Clarke, deputy G-2 of the Army and initiator of Operation VENONA.
In 1943, Operation VENONA began the super sensitive signals intelligence effort to decode NKVD/KGB codes at Arlington Hall, formerly a woman’s college, outside of Washington. It appears that McCarthy had an idea of using the communist-in-government issue before he met with Father Edmund Walsh, Dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, on January 7, 1950. Later, Drew Pearson, who initially reported the meeting in his column, came to realize his mistake in assuming that McCarthy’s attack on domestic communism began at the meeting with Father Walsh. When the Army discovered McCarthy’s source related to Operation VENONA, they transferred Clarke to Japan in 1950. The Army dealt with his treachery on August 31, 1954, and forced him to retire.3

**Eisenhower’s first confrontation with McCarthy**

Those acquainted with Eisenhower’s relationship with McCarthy are familiar with Eisenhower’s statement that he refused to “get in the gutter with that guy” when it came to confronting the Wisconsin Senator.2 Eisenhower did not publicly object when earlier McCarthy defamed his mentor, General George C. Marshall, by claiming that Marshall was involved in “a conspiracy so immense and an infamy so black as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man.”5 Although Eisenhower’s personality was not given to a public display of outrage, he had a chance to defend Marshall’s reputation during a campaign visit to Milwaukee in October 1952. He might not only have set the record straight, but also have taken on McCarthy on his own turf and deal him a blow to his career. However, before Eisenhower’s train reached Wisconsin, Tom Coleman, the Wisconsin GOP chairman, boarded the presidential train and warned Eisenhower not to make any inflammatory statement concerning McCarthy. Governor Walter Kohler and Henry Ringling, GOP National Committeeman, rushed to Peoria, Illinois, and met with Eisenhower at the Pere Marquette Hotel. Their goal was to deter Eisenhower from doing anything rash that might jeopardize the GOP’s chances in November. Finally, Eisenhower called McCarthy and the two spoke privately. Witnesses listening outside the door later claimed that the two argued strenuously. Jeff Broadwater cites Kevin McCann, an Eisenhower speechwriter, who recalled, “Ike explode[d] at the Wisconsin senator.”6

Earlier, Fred Seaton, who was also on the train, had leaked to Bill Lawrence of the *New York Times* that the General was going to lambast McCarthy for his comments about Marshall. Other Eisenhower aides did the same thing by warning journalists, “Wait until we get to Milwaukee and you will find out what the General thinks of Marshall.” *New York Times* publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger, who knew beforehand about the probable contents of Eisenhower’s speech, wired Sherman Adams that he was physically ill when he was informed about the omission of the Marshall paragraph.7 Eisenhower recounted the event to his friend Paul Helms, a California bakery industry executive, “I would not have you believe that I have acquiesced in, or by any means approve, the methods that McCarthy uses in his investigatory process. I despise them, and even during the campaign of ’52 I not only stated publicly (and privately to him) that I disapproved of these methods, but I did so in his own state.”7 To Eisenhower’s many admirers, however, he had failed. Eisenhower wanted to tell the public in Milwaukee “that to defend freedom, in short is – first of all – is to respect freedom….” Here I have a case in mind. Charges of disloyalty have in the past been leveled against General George C. Marshall.” Eisenhower planned on informing Wisconsin supporters, “I was privileged throughout the years of World War II to know General Marshall personally as Chief of Staff of the Army. I know him, as a man and as a soldier, to be dedicated with singular selflessness and the profoundest patriotism of the service of America. Here we have a sobering lesson of the way freedom must not defend itself.”9

Eisenhower never read that passage; instead, he listened to his political handlers who recommended that it would be politically unwise to openly challenge McCarthy. Ike regretted his decision, and the newspapermen who had had the opportunity to view the omitted paragraph interpreted Eisenhower’s omission as caving in to McCarthy’s excesses. Historian James Patterson went further and wrote that Eisenhower “kowtowed to McCarthy.”10 Now Anti-McCarthy Republicans and many Democrats believed that nothing could stop Joe McCarthy from continuing his slanderous attacks upon those he considered “Reds” in the State Department and in other government agencies. Even more troubling, as Herbert Parmet noted, McCarthy considered Eisenhower “a ‘political lightweight’ who was out of his element in dealing with the Washington infighting.” According to Parmet, McCarthy’s “attitude soon became contemptuous,” over time, and he miscalculated.11 McCarthy either failed to take proper measure of Eisenhower or was too intoxicated by his own political hubris. But the struggle that was about to ensue was one of McCarthy’s own making. As chief executive, Eisenhower may have detested McCarthy’s tactics, but no one in the administration came forward to challenge him publicly until McCarthy directed his venomous attack on General Ralph Zwicker, a much-decorated combat veteran of World War II and current commander at Camp Kilmer, NJ, regarding the promotion of an Army dentist, who just happened to be a communist. The junior senator from Wisconsin never realized, until it was too late, the political skill of President Eisenhower.

**Eisenhower’s hidden-hand style**

For Eisenhower, McCarthy was not just a thorn in his side, but one of many problems he had to face during his first term. Eisenhower’s political complications were not the work of the Democrats, but those of his own party, whom he considered
“reactionary,” especially those who rallied not only to McCarthy, but who also used the Bricker amendment to return to American isolationism and weaken NATO. What sort of leader was Dwight Eisenhower? When he commanded all Allied forces in the European Theater during World War II, he left the job of removing subordinates incompetent of command to his capable Chief of Staff, Walter Bedell Smith. Similarly, when the time came, Eisenhower delegated the McCarthy problem to others. When McCarthy attacked the Army, however, it was personal. As the fiery C. D. Jackson, formerly of *Fortune* rightly claimed, “McCarthy had declared war on the President.”

Political scientist Fred Greenstein calls Eisenhower’s method of presidential leadership “the hidden-hand” approach. In a letter to his friend, Paul Helms, Eisenhower outlined his style. Eisenhower wrote, “In war, I had one simple rule that I tried to follow—take full and prompt responsibility for every single thing that happens that is—or even looks remotely like a failure.” More important, he told Helms, “I have developed a practice which, as far as I know, I have never violated. That practice is to avoid public mention of any name unless it can be done with favorable intent and connotation; reserve all criticism for the private conference; speak only good in public.” He also noted, “A leader’s job is to get others to go along with him in the promotion of something.” During the most heated period of Army-McCarthy hearings, Eisenhower later explained in a letter to Helms, “I am more than ever convinced that ‘leadership’ cannot be imposed; a climate must be created that makes men receptive to and desirous of fighting for the principles of the man currently in the position of the ‘leader.’ Of one thing I am firmly convinced—the basic good sense of the American people and their ability to overcome unpleasantness and to rise to any crisis that confronts them” [italics added]. In the Helms letter, Eisenhower cryptically detailed his distinct leadership style and the undying loyalty he maintained among his subordinates in the clandestine effort to challenge Joe McCarthy.

In the summer of 1953, Robert Stillmore, a low-level intelligence officer at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, was influenced by the fear of Soviet espionage and decided to call Joe McCarthy concerning his alarm of subversion among employees working at the Evans Signals Laboratory. Stillmore’s telephone call began a series of events that ultimately contributed to the Eisenhower administration’s decision to not only resist McCarthy’s destructive investigations at Fort Monmouth, but also his forays throughout the Executive Branch, including the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Government Printing Office, and the Department of Defense. In recalling McCarthy’s fall, few have focused on two Kansans – Dwight Eisenhower and Fred Seaton – sons of the Plains and reared in Kansas, who embodied the commitment to justice and fair play common to the state’s frontier heritage. Though anti-communists, they also believed in due process and in “innocent until proven guilty.” In many ways, they became unsung heroes through their efforts to limit the paranoia that gripped the United States in the 1950s. One was President and former Commander of Allied forces during World War II, and the other was a reluctant combatant in the struggle. Fred Seaton, an Eisenhower loyalist, never imagined that he would find himself in the middle of the McCarthy affair.

The future Army-McCarthy hearings that ultimately discredited McCarthy were, on the surface, initiated by a single telephone call when McCarthy sought to uncover an earlier Soviet intelligence operation at the US Army Signal School and Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, NJ. Closely linked, but not totally separate from McCarthy’s investigation, were the efforts of Joe McCarthy and Roy Cohn to procure a commission for an unpaid staffer G. David Schine, a close personal friend of Cohn and heir to the Shine hotel fortune. One scholar said of the relationship, “Schine was Roy Cohn’s special friend–though exactly how ‘special’ remains a mystery.” Even Lillian Hellman, who was attacked for prior political affiliations, speculated about them when she said the three were “Bonnie, Bonnie, and Clyde.” During the ensuing investigation of the Counterintelligence Corps, Fred Seaton discovered the exact nature of that relationship.

Officially, the McCarthy investigation into subversion at Fort Monmouth started via the “purloined letter,” identifying thirty-five security risks at the Army Signal Center. Robert Stillmore, a junior security officer at Fort Monmouth, provided this material; however, J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI were assumed for years as the source. The materials detailed alleged lax security at the post which provided McCarthy’s investigators an excuse to examine those claims. McCarthy, under the pretext of following the still-warm trail of the accused Soviet atomic spy Julius Rosenberg, now shifted his attention from the State Department to the US Army. In the process, many politicians, both Democrat and Republican, came to see the Wisconsin senator as a dangerous opportunist seeking the fallen mantle of the late Huey Long, and they believed McCarthy had to be stopped. McCarthy’s investigation mobilized the Eisenhower administration, not only to defend the Army, but ultimately to reduce the Wisconsin Senator’s power. But that was not evident at the start of the Fort Monmouth hearings on August 31, 1953.

On September 15, just over two weeks after the opening of the McCarthy investigation at Fort Monmouth, Fred Seaton was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
and Legislation. Seaton, a 1931 graduate of Kansas State Agricultural College and a major figure at Seaton Publications in both Manhattan, Kansas, and Hastings, Nebraska, was the right man to help Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson stay on message during Wilson’s press briefings. Seaton was an Eisenhower loyalist, and he had been a McCarthy critic ever since his short stint as the US Senator from Nebraska when he temporarily filled the seat of Kenneth Wherry who had died suddenly in Washington on November 2, 1951. Seaton was assigned the responsibility to lead the Eisenhower response to McCarthy’s forays against the Army.21

Robert Stevens, the Secretary of the Army, offered to cooperate with McCarthy’s inquiry into Fort Monmouth in the early fall of 1953. The Army Secretary, in a sign of good faith, took McCarthy on a tour of the post. Shorty thereafter, General Kirke B. Lawton, the post commander, of his own volition, suspended thirty-three employees who had previously been cleared by the loyalty review board. This process had begun during the Truman administration to adjudicate loyalty cases among federal employees, especially those accused of being security risks. But McCarthy demanded more, including all security records and loyalty board files of those who had made the determination to clear the thirty-three employees in question. Earlier in 1953, Assistant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin notified H. Strove Hensel, the Defense Department’s General Counsel, that the Eisenhower administration would continue Truman’s policy of not releasing records relating to loyalty board investigations and board members.22 The stage was about set for a titanic battle between McCarthy and the Eisenhower administration.

A special request made by Roy Cohn

For most Americans, or at least for the media, the loyalty board requests appeared at the heart of the struggle between McCarthy and the Eisenhower administration. But on Tuesday, October 21, 1953, Roy Cohn called Army Counsel John Adams, seeking access to Major General Henry Reichelderfer, Chief of the Army Security Agency at Arlington Hall. Adams believed that his boss, Army Secretary Robert Stevens, should be notified and personally handle Cohn’s request. Later, Stevens returned the call, while Jack Lucas, Stevens’ secretary, monitored the conversation. Cohn told Stevens, “Gen. R made the decisions not to kick out [Aaron] Coleman in ’46 [sic] when they found documents in his room.”23 Just as the conversation turned to Reichelderfer’s alleged transgressions, Stevens signaled to Lucas to cease monitoring the call. General Reichelderfer was not only assigned to the loyalty review board, but was also responsible for the top secret intelligence VENONA program. Later all references to Reichelderfer were removed from correspondence relating to Cohn’s initial request.24

Cohn’s demand set off alarms in the Pentagon, because Henry Reichelderfer had handled the crown jewel of American intelligence, the highly classified cryptanalysis effort to penetrate Soviet NKVD/KGB codes. Stevens immediately called Fred Seaton, who was just settling into his new post as Charlie Wilson’s unofficial watchdog. Seaton passed the information to the White House. Not long after, Eisenhower contacted General Pete Carroll, his internal security chief. Now the administration began to take a second look at McCarthy’s probe into Fort Monmouth.25

Fred Seaton was well aware of the problems McCarthy was causing the administration and his first meeting dealing with McCarthy occurred on October 16, nearly a week before Cohn’s October 21 call to John Adams. On that occasion, Seaton and the Pentagon were in a damage control mode, attempting to limit the negative publicity arising from the McCarthy hearings at Fort Monmouth. An analysis of Seaton’s telephone logs shows that he kept Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, Sherman Adams, informed on the Army’s response to McCarthy’s investigation. Now with this call, and the pressure McCarthy was placing for access to the Army’s Security Review Board personnel, Seaton offered Stevens his professional advice: “On the McCarthy thing—on his request for those loyalty records—as far as I am personally concerned, I think that now [it] become[s] a matter of principle,” whether to have the administration surrender to McCarthy’s demands.26

But even before McCarthy’s official foray into Fort Monmouth’s security concerns, Eisenhower was advised during a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) held on July 9, of the impact McCarthy was having on foreign perceptions of the United States. The minutes show “the name of McCarthy was on everyone’s lips and he [McCarthy] was constantly compared to Hitler.” At that point, Eisenhower asked what could be done to prove that “the Republican Party was not isolationist and not irresponsible?” After John Foster Dulles, who feared McCarthy to the point that he hired a McCarthy ally, R. W. Scott McLeod, as the State Department’s Security Chief, informed the President that foreign leaders “seemed to believe that we are moving into an American fascism, under McCarthy as leader,” Eisenhower quickly responded by asking “as to whether any use could be made of covert radio to attack and ridicule McCarthy” [emphasis added].” It appeared that Eisenhower was contemplating a strategy that could hasten McCarthy’s fall. Allan Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence and brother of the Secretary of State, took a far different approach, when William Bundy, an agency official and son-in-law of Harry Truman’s former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, came under attack by McCarthy. McCarthy’s claim involved Bundy’s monetary contribution to Alger Hiss’s legal defense fund. Hiss, a former New Dealer and State Department official, was convicted of perjury.27
More significant, McCarthy was now vulnerable to an attack by the administration involving the draft status of G. David Schine, an unpaid McCarthy staffer. Like many privileged sons, Schine had sought various methods to evade the draft since becoming I-A on his eighteenth birthday in September 1945. He initially avoided induction by a series of maneuvers including changing draft boards and seeking a deferment by enrolling in the Merchant Marine Academy, which he failed to attend. Later, he traveled abroad, keeping one step ahead of his induction notice. According to the Pentagon, “his ordered induction never caught up with him until the 1940 draft had ended” in 1947. When Selective Service was reintroduced in 1948, Schine proceeded to register at Local Draft Board No. 105 in Los Angeles, California. Once again he received a deferment as a student, while he attended Harvard. Later, his family, and their lawyers, made efforts to convince his draft board that “he should be excused from military service.” When those efforts failed, he again avoided induction claiming a back injury he allegedly suffered in 1947.

When Schine could no longer escape induction, Cohn and McCarthy made a concerted effort to have Schine commissioned in one of the armed services starting in mid-July 1953. By the time of the Fort Monmouth investigation, McCarthy was pushing the Army to commission his young, unpaid assistant. The request first came to Major General Miles Reber, Office of the Legislative and Liaison Division of the US Army. Cohn met with Reber to emphasize the necessity of obtaining a commission for Schine. John Adams, the Army counsel, recalled that the request followed the Army’s standard guidelines, and Reber was “instructed positively to proceed strictly in accordance with [Army] regulations.” Schine’s application was forwarded to a board of officers in New York for evaluation. The board concluded Schine “was not qualified for a direct commission and was therefore rejected.” Both Cohn and McCarthy were notified of the Army’s decision, but that did not stop McCarthy. By early August, Reber had explored the possibility of Schine obtaining a commission in either the Air Force or the Navy, all to no avail.

The situation between Joe McCarthy, Roy Cohn, and the Army escalated throughout the fall, especially when Schine was inducted into the US Army on November 3 and assigned to Fort Dix, New Jersey for basic training. John Adams often took the brunt of Cohn’s wrath after Schine was sent to Fort Dix. After nearly a month in the service, General Cornelius Ryan, the post commander, called Adams on December 8 and complained that Schine’s “situation was completely out of hand.” During basic training Schine received passes for the weekends to New York, Trenton, and Philadelphia, as well as telephone call privileges, all perks denied to other basic trainees. While this was transpiring, Cohn was harassing Adams to have Schine transferred to New York. Again and again Adams told Cohn, Schine had to fulfill his military obligation like all other draftees. Cohn pressed Adams and said, “The Army is making Dave eat shit because he works for Joe,” because Schine was assigned to KP.

John Adams recalled meeting McCarthy outside the Federal Courthouse in Foley Square on December 17. Earlier, McCarthy had attended a dinner party in New York with Francis Cardinal Spellman, Joseph P. Kennedy, and General Ryan. According to Adams’s account, “Ryan told the group about Schine’s escapades, describing such irregularities in his basic training as [well as] his frequent trips to Trenton.” McCarthy informed Adams that he advised his staff to “do nothing with reference to Schine.” Later at lunch in New York with Roy Cohn, Joe McCarthy, and one of McCarthy’s investigators, Frank Carr, Adams raised the issue of Schine in order to get McCarthy on the record concerning Schine’s status. Adams was shocked as Cohn “was particularly abusive, both to me, to Secretary Stevens, and to McCarthy. The more he abused McCarthy, the more McCarthy withdrew from his [previous] position” that Schine was not indispensable to the McCarthy committee; now, Schine was essential for the smooth operation of McCarthy’s team. On the way back to Grand Central Station, McCarthy capitulated to Cohn and asked Adams “if there wasn’t some way to get Schine assigned to New York.”

By mid-December, the syndicated columnist Drew Pearson, a noted McCarthy opponent who had been involved in a violent confrontation with McCarthy nearly three years earlier, informed his readers of the special status that Schine enjoyed at Fort Dix. Soon other papers, including the *Baltimore Sun* and the *New York Post* ran features of their own, including interviews with members of Schine’s training unit. A month later, on January 18, 1954, John Adams had another agonizing telephone conversation with Cohn, involving a possible overseas posting for Schine. Adams asked Cohn, “Roy, what will happen if Dave gets an overseas assignment?” Cohn was furious, “Stevens is through as Secretary of the Army.” Adams, by this time was well used to Cohn’s diatribes, responded, “Oh, come on Roy, can that stuff. Really, what’s going to happen if Schine gets an overseas assignment?” Cohn made a threat that shocked Adams: “We will wreck the Army; we’ve got stuff on the Army to have an investigation run indefinitely. We will smear you all over every newspaper in the country. … We’re not going to do it ourselves but we’ve got another committee interested in it. … We’re going to wreck the Army.”

After Secretary Stevens left for the Far East on the previous day, Frank Carr called John Adams and told him that McCarthy wanted several members of the loyalty-security appeals board to appear before his committee. Adams was shocked and reminded Carr that, according to a prior agreement, “this would not develop and this situation would not come up.” But it
did. For those with knowledge of VENONA, it seemed that McCarthy’s prime target was General Reichelderfer.

**Fred Seaton and the National Security Agency**

A meeting was arranged between Seaton and General Ralph Canine, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), on February 1, 1954. Canine brought with him the NSA’s legal counsel, Sidney Smith. No minutes were taken, and the meeting was strictly off the record; however, James Bamford, the NSA’s unofficial historian, contends that Smith made the surprising recommendation that the office of “general counsel be abolished because it was unnecessary,” obviously not realizing that eliminating the office of general counsel removed one layer of accountability in limiting the NSA’s ability to collect intelligence on American citizens in the United States. In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, neither the CIA nor the NSA were authorized to conduct intelligence gathering or monitoring of American nationals within the continental United States. Bamford did not realize the significance of this decision in light of the Army-McCarthy affair and accepted this move without much thought. Now, without an effective check on the National Security Agency’s capabilities, the Pentagon had a tool that could effectively screen McCarthy’s every move.35

On one hand, Seaton was working as the administration’s case officer in the clandestine effort to counter McCarthy’s efforts to gain access to Henry Reichelderfer and other loyalty board members; on the other, he was offering political advice to Robert Stevens and John Adams in responding to McCarthy. Something had to be done. McCarthy’s assault on the Army was becoming more serious as both McCarthy and Cohn sought greater access to Loyalty and Security Board members in order, it was feared, to gain entry to VENONA. At the same time, McCarthy was pressing for greater access and privileges for G. David Schine at Fort Dix. In the early afternoon on January 8, 1954, Robert Stevens returned a call from Fred Seaton concerning Schine’s status during basic training and his subsequent post-basic training assignment.

During the conversation, Seaton sought to apprise Stevens of the pitfalls that would occur if the Army assigned Schine to New York without obtaining the required training. Seaton told Stevens, “I don’t want to have this be something to make you angry, but are you certain that the boy’s [Schine’s] record in the Service stands up, that somebody didn’t slip a gear on those [IBM] cards?” Stevens responded, “I have no reason to doubt it.” Yet Seaton explained the situation to Stevens, highlighting the White House’s view and informed Stevens that “through no fault of your own, I am afraid this will turn out to be an unfortunate assignment not only for the Army but for Sen. McCarthy and the White House because of what has taken place between the President and the Senator. I, again, am not recommending that this kid be given a dirty deal, but I am a half-hearted second because of how the hell you explain it. I don’t know.” Yet Seaton was trying to give Stevens an out in order to deny Schine an assignment as an Army investigator with the criminal investigation division (CID) and a posting to New York City. “Another thing you probably won’t be in a position to knock down,” according to Seaton, “is this scuttlebutt that he [Schine] has been off every week-end, and that he was AWOL once – with this sort of background” Stevens could have been provided an opportunity to deny Schine that posting.36

**Special treatment for Private Schine and the fate of a Communist dentist**

Seaton advised the White House that John Adams needed help in responding to the pressures McCarthy was exerting on the Army. According to Sherman Adams, both he and Henry Cabot Lodge realized that “a more thoughtful look at the situation” was called for by the administration without acknowledging Seaton’s role. A meeting was arranged at the Attorney General’s office on January 21, 1954. Those in attendance included Sherman Adams, the President’s chief of staff; Henry Cabot Lodge, ambassador to the UN; Herbert Brownell, the Attorney General; and John Adams, the Army’s chief counsel. John Adams outlined how McCarthy and his staff sought preferential treatment in the Army for Schine. Sherman Adams, who no doubt knew of Schine’s special circumstances at Fort Dix, claimed in *First Hand Report*, that the account provided by John Adams “was strange and incredible” and the unusual treatment he had received at Dix such as avoiding KP and receiving weekend passes and telephone privileges were all benefits not afforded to standard trainees. The Army counsel outlined the efforts by McCarthy and his aides to obtain either a commission in the Army, Navy, or Air Force for Schine or an assignment with the CIA starting in July 1953. After listening to evidence presented by John Adams, Sherman Adams recommended that John Adams develop a detailed chronological summary of McCarthy’s efforts and present it to McCarthy’s subcommittee.” The recommendation led to the creation of the Adams chronology, which was leaked to friendly journalists before the official distribution to the members of the subcommittee and raised questions regarding Schine’s status which led to the subsequent Army-McCarthy hearings.

Just over a week later on January 29, Army authorities at Fort Dix were prepared to publicize an investigation of Schine’s preferential treatment during basic training, and it did not take long for McCarthy to respond. On the following day, during his subcommittee’s hearing McCarthy featured the testimony of Major Irving Peress, an Army dentist stationed at Camp Kilmer, NJ. Peress was drafted into the Army; like other doctors and dentists conscripted during the Korean War, he was
promoted to Captain. But there was a problem at the hearing; Peress refused to answer questions regarding his membership in any organization that was listed as subversive. Instead, when asked whether he was a communist, he responded by claiming his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The 36-year-old Peress had been assigned to Camp Kilmer due to a family emergency regarding his wife and daughter who lived in New York. However, both the FBI and Army security officials were investigating Peress, who once again claimed Fifth Amendment protection when asked about his previous political affiliations. Then earlier in August, like many other medical professionals in uniform, he requested a promotion to Major which was granted on November 2.  

The Peress case came to McCarthy’s attention in December, when commanding officer at Camp Kilmer Brigadier General Ralph Zwicker contacted McCarthy’s staff after not receiving the action he expected from the Army in removing Peress. As the Schine situation was escalating, Roy Cohn notified John Adams that there was a communist at Camp Kilmer. Initially, Adams was not familiar with the Peress case and told Cohn he would call him back. A few days later, he then notified Cohn that the Army was about to discharge Peress. Frank Carr, one of McCarthy’s principal investigators, called Adams on Wednesday, January 27, and demanded the Army present Peress to the McCarthy committee at the Foley Square Court House in New York on Saturday, January 30. Following the grilling by McCarthy, Peress was a physical wreck and immediately contacted Zwicker to request a discharge effective on February 1.  

**McCarthy attacks the Army**

While Zwicker and the Army were happy that the troublesome dentist would be discharged, they were unaware of a “Dear Bob” letter McCarthy had sent to the Secretary of the Army on February 1. McCarthy wanted blood and demanded that Peress, as well as all those involved in his promotion, be court-martialed. McCarthy’s new battle cry was “Who promoted Peress?” McCarthy would not rest and continued his assault on the Army. John Adams quickly realized that this was just a political stunt and said as much in a memorandum he sent to Robert Stevens on February 5, when he informed the Secretary of the Army that McCarthy planned on grilling Peress in the Pentagon. Zwicker was under orders not to discuss the matter. After a series of verbal jabs, McCarthy had enough and declared: “Any man who has been given the honor of being promoted to General and who says ‘I will protect another general who protects Communists’ is not fit to wear that uniform, General.” Stevens called Zwicker the following day and Zwicker warned the Army Secretary, “I feel that if that [protecting officers] is not done, it is going to make a great deal of difference to the Army because if any other officer – if his character is impugned as mine was yesterday and the officers in our Army or higher authority are doing nothing to refute those statements, I feel that the loyalty of officers to the Department of the Army is going to vanish.”

**The infamous Chicken Lunch**

In order to defuse an already volatile situation between Stevens and McCarthy, Richard Nixon arranged a meeting in his Capitol Hill office on February 23 with representatives from the White House and the GOP Senate leadership in order to agree on a compromise. Neither White House representative, Jack Martin nor Jerry Persons, were actively opposed to McCarthy; instead they sought an accommodation with the Wisconsin Senator, as they believed Eisenhower sought to remain above the fray, as he often claimed. Richard Nixon, Everett Dirksen, and William Knowland all encouraged Stevens to cooperate when he agreed to meet with McCarthy during a luncheon the following day. Following the “chicken luncheon, however, the end result was far more damaging for Stevens when Karl Mundt mett with the press and informed reporters that Secretary Stevens had agreed to provide all of the names of those involved in promoting Irving Peress. The London Times declared that Joe McCarthy had achieved something that the British Army could not accomplish during the American Revolution—“the surrender of the American Army.” Stevens never realized the mistake until he read the accounts in the evening papers. He then called Press Secretary Jim Haggerty and Richard Nixon, breaking down during the conversation and offering to resign. Since resignation would have been interpreted as a sign of weakness and only serve to strengthen McCarthy’s hand, it was out of the question. Sides were now drawn; the “chicken luncheon” only intensified Eisenhower’s determination to reduce McCarthy’s influence once and for all. After McCarthy’s censure was assured,
Eisenhower agreed with Herbert Brownell on December 2, 1954, that both Robert Stevens and John Adams “had to go” when all was said and done and a decent interval had passed.44

**ADLAI STEVENSON LINKS IIKE TO MCCARTHY**

The situation spiraled out of control when former Illinois governor and former Democratic 1952 presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson spoke to a national audience on March 6, 1954. He attacked the Eisenhower administration for not standing up to McCarthy because GOP professionals saw “McCarthyism is the best Republican formula for political success.” On March 8, Eisenhower asked Chairman of the Republican National Committee Len Hall to contact Richard Nixon for the administration’s response. Eisenhower’s move forestalled McCarthy’s claim for equal time on the networks. According to one insider, “Nixon wasn’t leaping at the hazardous opportunity before him,” and Len Hall felt Eisenhower had to “twist his arm.” On March 9, Colonel Charles W. Delanoy, an officer assigned to Seaton’s office, called Seaton with the following message: “Matter of VP Nixon in which only you and [Roger] Kyes and [Struve] Hensel should become involved.” It seemed that Nixon attempted to walk both sides of the street—loyalty to the administration, and maintaining ties to his old ally, Joe McCarthy. However, Nixon was caught by telephonic surveillance conducted by the National Security Agency. The notation was obvious; the NSA had tapped McCarthy’s phones, intercepting Nixon’s call. One participant, writing in the privacy of his unpublished memoir, noted: “Neither was Vice President Nixon … on the side of the ‘angels.’”47

The situation changed as the administration initiated the first phase of its public counterattack against McCarthy. On March 9, Senator Ralph Flanders, a solid conservative from Vermont, took to the Senate floor and openly challenged McCarthy by accusing him of weakening the United States in the struggle with the Soviet Union. Flanders went so far as to compare McCarthy to a woman who comes into another woman’s house after twenty years looking for dirt—in a political sense, communist subversion—then “dons his war paint. He goes into his war dance. He emits his war whoops. He goes forth to battle and proudly returns with a scalp of a pink Army dentist.” Without connection to the administration’s effort, legendary CBS commentator Edward R. Morrow exposed McCarthy’s tactics to the American public on “See It Now” the next evening. Morrow concluded that McCarthy’s “primary achievement has been in confusing the public mind, as between internal and the external threats of Communism. We must not confuse dissent with disloyalty.” Earlier in the day, Charles Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, invited McCarthy to a lunch at the Pentagon. Well-prepared by Fred Seaton and H. Struve Hensel, Wilson told McCarthy of the Adams Report which highlighted the special treatment given to G. David Schine at Fort Dix. Wilson informed McCarthy that he would release the material unless Roy Cohn was removed from McCarthy’s committee. McCarthy, according to McCarthy’s biographer David Oshinsky, “never blinked” and “told the Army to go to hell.”48

**THE RELEASE OF THE ADAMS CHRONOLOGY**

The battle intensified once the Adams chronology was officially released on March 11. By mid-March, the Pentagon mounted an extensive collection effort, an intelligence investigation to discredit McCarthy. Seaton began to receive information from NSA wiretaps on Friday, March 19, a month before the official opening of the Army-McCarthy Hearings on April 22, even before Struve Hensel told Seaton he thought the Pentagon should press “for details.” The details included all monitored telephone calls and other transcripts compiled by Robert Stevens’ secretary, Jack Lucas. More importantly, Hensel wanted to “get Army intelligence to find out exactly where Schine went while stationed at Fort Dix; question his chauffeur, check up on those witnesses who allegedly had to be interviewed by Schine in Trenton; find out whether phone operators listened in on Schine’s conversations—a total of twenty-three avenues to explore [italics added].”49

The Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) moved quickly and located Schine’s chauffeur. Major General Gilman Mudgett, Army G-2 (Intelligence), transmitted the information to Seaton by phone. According to the notes found in Seaton’s files, the chauffeur “worked for Schine Dec. 1953 – stayed on a month or so.” The message indicated that the driver knew of the relationship between Cohn and Schine—having driven Cohn and Schine from Fort Dix on numerous occasions—a relationship that many contemporaries speculated about and later made reference to on the floor of the Senate. Mudgett’s report told Seaton, “He [CIC agent] thinks [the chauffeur] is ready to testify,” and the chauffeur recalled that he drove them to Philadelphia and New York. Periodically during those trips, the chauffeur looked in the rearview mirror and saw them “engaged in homo-sexual acts in the back of the car.” At times, he remembered “driving them from New York to Fort Dix at speeds between 25 and 45 miles per hour, often arriving at Fort Dix between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m.”50

CIC agents were steps ahead of the more experienced FBI as they looked into all phases of Schine’s life. Written reports were kept to a minimum, and everything was kept on a strict need-to-know basis. It was not long before FBI agents notified J. Edgar Hoover that military intelligence was looking into Schine’s past. Two days after Hensel’s directive to Seaton, Hoover received a memorandum from the Los Angeles FBI office “that a representative of Region II, 115th Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment contacted the Los Angeles Office … looking for information concerning Schine … however, the nature of that investigation was not stated.”
The FBI did not cooperate and assumed that the request was related to information concerning Schine’s draft history and Cohn’s efforts to acquire a commission for his friend since Schine had used Hoover as a character reference.51

SEATON REACHES OUT TO DREW PEARSON

March was pivotal for Seaton and his efforts to resolve the McCarthy problem. Although columnist Drew Pearson was the administration’s bête noire and members of the administration were advised not to contact him, Seaton called Pearson at approximately 8:30 PM on March 15, from his office phone. The call lasted over an hour. Earlier, on February 24 Pearson offered to help Stevens with McCarthy but the offer was rebuffed. Now, Seaton and Pearson unofficially began a fruitful and temporary alliance directed at their mutual enemy. Pearson’s hostility towards McCarthy stemmed from McCarthy’s reporting on charges of subversives in the US government. For each charge, Pearson often raised countercharges to the point that McCarthy told acquaintances that he didn’t know “whether to kill Pearson or just maim him.” By 1953, reports started surfacing and appeared in Hank Greenspun’s Las Vegas Sun that claimed McCarthy was a homosexual. McCarthy’s ally J. Edgar Hoover believed that these reports were a joint effort of Drew Pearson and columnist Jack Anderson.52

Now Seaton had access to Drew Pearson’s archives, and he could examine all the material that the journalist had collected on McCarthy, much of which was never published. Seaton, however, discovered something more troubling than the derogatory information he was seeking: one of McCarthy’s early sources was Carter Weldon Clarke, Deputy G-2 of the Army, who held the highest of security clearances and had access to VENONA, the crown jewel of American intelligence. More troubling was the realization that the man who had organized Pearson’s archives, formerly one of Pearson’s trusted aides, was David Karr, a man who had been revealed as a Soviet agent by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The VENONA decrypts had exposed Karr’s links to Soviet intelligence as early as 1944, as initially speculated by HUAC. McCarthy had claimed that Pearson was associated with a known Soviet agent; obviously, this information came from either HUAC or VENONA. Seaton, now privy to the secrets of Arlington Hall, faced a potential national security threat regarding McCarthy’s demands for access to General Henry Reischelderfer and indirectly to VENONA.53

PAUL HOFFMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

One of Ike’s unofficial advisors was Paul Hoffman, a former administrator of the European Economic Administration, former President of the Ford Foundation, the Fund for the Republic, and executive of Studebaker. More importantly, Hoffman was an internationalist and no friend of McCarthy. In his many contacts with Eisenhower, he proposed the novel idea that, if the President so desired, the President had it in his authority to deny to any congressional committee access to executive branch officials. Seeking legal advice, Eisenhower called Herbert Brownell’s office on March 2. When Attorney General was unavailable, Assistant Attorney General William Rogers took the call. Eisenhower asked if he had the authority to keep someone from testifying before a congressional committee. For instance, if “I made up my mind that McCarthy is abusing someone in a Dept. What is constitutional for me to do [about it] in this regard?” Rogers told the President that he would get back to him by 9:30 AM the following day. On March 3, a twenty-four page-report entitled “Power and Authority of the President of the United States to Withhold Information Relating to the Executive Branch of Government from Congressional Committees” arrived at the White House.54

Hoffman had further discussions with Eisenhower on this issue, particularly on March 24, and in a letter dated March 25, wherein he told the President, “It is really your suggestion, because it is based upon the statement you made during our conversation yesterday.” Basically the problem “is this: — Sooner or later — and probably sooner — Senator McCarthy will again summon for questioning — and brow-beating — some member of the Executive Branch of Government who should not be summoned; someone who is being summoned solely for the purposes of providing headlines for the Senator.” Hoffman proposed instead, “I suggest that you issue instructions to this person to refuse the summons from Senator McCarthy and give the reasons for doing so.” Eisenhower was so impressed, he sent Brownell a memorandum outlining Hoffman’s letter and notified Brownell: “Assuming that the time may come when I may find it necessary to take the action suggested in the letter, could you prepare a draft of a statement, accompanying my instructions?” Eisenhower did leave Brownell an opening: “If you believe, of course, that this suggestion has no merit whatsoever, just please return the letter to me.” In the Eisenhower Library, there is no evidence that the letter was returned. The possible use of executive privilege now was another arrow in the President’s quiver to be used against Joe McCarthy in the Army-McCarthy Hearings.55

Framing the argument was crucial too, and no one understood better than Fred Seaton. The Adams chronology was a powerful weapon in exposing McCarthy’s investigation of the Army, but only four men knew of the chronology’s existence: Sherman Adams, James Haggerty, H. Struve Hensel, and Fred Seaton. Of those, only Seaton was fully aware of the completed document. After the initial meeting on January 21, Seaton kept pressing John Adams to refine the timeline of events. In the words of William Bragg Ewald, his objective was to make the chronology “unassailable” by McCarthy and his allies.
Sherman Adams in his memoir, noted, “Not entirely by accident, the Army’s report on its troubles with Schine fell into the hands of a few newspaper correspondents before it was seen by the subcommittee, and their stories built up a backfire against McCarthy, as intended.” Ewald gave the impression that the sole source was John Adams. However, a careful examination of Seaton’s call notes and appointment book for 1954, clearly indicated that Seaton strategically leaked incriminating information to Joe and Stewart Alsop, as well as other prominent journalists before the official release on March 11 of the Adams chronology. The timeline raised serious questions concerning McCarthy’s intentions.56

**LOOKING FOR A NEW LAWYER**

It was acknowledged that the Army had to find an experienced attorney to represent the Army’s case in the upcoming Army-McCarthy hearings. Obviously, John Adams could not defend the Army’s position because he was involved in the affair and was not a seasoned litigator. But who could take on the task of confronting Joe McCarthy and Roy Cohn in the hearings? On April 1, Stevens approached Seaton and asked about the lawyer who would handle the Army’s case. Seaton assured the Army Secretary, “There’s no need to worry.” Earlier, Seaton had been discussing the Army’s legal problems with New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey who believed he knew the perfect attorney for the job. Dewey proceeded to make a call on behalf of the administration to the office of a talented yet unheralded Boston lawyer and partner in the respected Boston firm of Hale and Dorr. His name was Joseph N. Welch. Once Seaton had Charlie Wilson’s approval, the deal was set for Welch to become Special Counsel of the United States Army.57

Welch and his assistant, James St. Clair, flew to Washington on the afternoon of April 2 and met with Seaton, Hensel, and Stevens in Seaton’s office at 5:00 PM. They then proceeded to the Ambassador Hotel. With the two lawyers was Fred Fisher; however, during the course of the initial meeting, Welch discovered that Fisher had earlier joined the National Lawyers’ Guild, long considered a Communist front organization by the FBI since the 1940s but only designated a subversive organization by Attorney General Herbert Brownell on August 26, 1953. As a consequence, Welch realized that Fisher had to return to Boston. Seaton immediately called Jim Haggerty, Ike’s press secretary, at 10:24 PM and left a message that they had an “emergency,” no doubt concerning Fisher’s past affiliation.58 Stevens phoned his secretary, Jack Lucas, not to monitor any further conversations with Welch. The Army was adopting stealth-like tactics in the upcoming struggle with McCarthy.

Before the start of the hearings, Welch was briefed on everything the Army had on Schine, McCarthy, and Cohn from the materials developed by John Adams and gathered by Seaton from the CIC. After nearly two weeks on the job, Welch called Stevens’ office and told Jack Lucas that “Mr. [John] Adams is making as beautiful a start on his interrogation as SA [Secretary of the Army] himself made; at risk of SA thinking it ‘treasonable,’ Mr. W[elch] will leave Washington at 4:30 to go home and [will] come back down Sunday night.” Even as the final touches were being made by Welch and his team, Stevens phoned Seaton for advice because he wondered what should happen if McCarthy requested a group picture at the start of the hearings.59

**THE ARMY-MCCARTHY HEARINGS**

When the klieg lights came on and the cameras rolled in the Senate Caucus Room on April 22, no one knew what to expect. John Adams initially thought that Welch was outclassed by Cohn and McCarthy and thought Welch, while “nattily dressed in bow tie and tweeds … looked like a large round penguin. He affected an appearance of overwhelming innocence by an occasional smile.”60 Welch’s game plan was more than to counterpunch with McCarthy. Instead, he sought to limit McCarthy’s ability to call witnesses and McCarthy’s time-tested strategy of redirecting the course of a hearing. Welch waited for the moment to strike, and it came with the famous “doctored photo,” when McCarthy sought to exaggerate Schine’s importance to his committee by cropping others out of the picture. McCarthy’s strategy allowed Welch to directly convey to both McCarthy and Cohn what the Army knew of the special relationship between all three, as provided by Schine’s chauffeur and the CIC investigators during the testimony of Jim Juliana, one of McCarthy’s staffers. At one point, Welch pressed Juliana about the source of the photo, “Did you think this came from a pixie, where did you think this picture I hold in my hand comes from?” Juliana responded that he didn’t know, and then suddenly, almost on cue, McCarthy interrupted Welch with a point of order.

McCarthy walked into a well-prepared ambush set by the crafty Bostonian. “Will counsel for my benefit define—I think he might be an expert on this—the word ‘pixie?’” McCarthy asked. Then Welch pounced with the line that everyone in the Senate Caucus Room as well as those watching on television at home clearly understood: “Yes, I would say, Mr. Senator, that a pixie is a close relative of a fairy. Shall I proceed, sir? Have I enlightened you?”61 Cohn, “who liked to think that he could take shots like this and brush them off, called Welch’s sally ‘malicious,’ ‘wicked,’ and ‘indecent,’” according to Nicholas von Hoffman, Roy Cohn’s biographer. However, Cohn believed that Welch had only heard the rumors that were prevalent in Washington about his relationship with Schine. Cohn could not have been more wrong.62

Nearly a week before John Adams was to testify on May 12, Welch met Henry Cabot Lodge in New York, warning the UN Ambassador that he might be called to testify before the
subcommittee. Following the meeting, Lodge wrote Eisenhower on May 7 that if he were summoned to testify, “It is my intention, therefore, to decline to give testimony in that capacity. I told Sherman Adams and Herbert Brownell about my view in that matter.” Eisenhower responded on May 10 that, on the advice of counsel, he did not intend to have any of his personal staff appear before the subcommittee. Not long after, John Adams appeared and in the middle of his well-rehearsed testimony, Adams revealed to the Senators the special meeting held in William Rogers’s office on January 21, attended by Herbert Brownell, William Rogers, Sherman Adams, and Henry Cabot Lodge. The purpose of the meeting had been to deal with McCarthy’s and Cohn’s undue pressure placed on the Army concerning Schine’s treatment as a draftee. John Adams’ disclosure mobilized the Democrats and they directed Adams to return on Monday, May 17, with an administration response or face the likelihood of a subpoena.

**MAKING THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE**

Following Adams’ revelation the administration moved quickly, as if rehearsed. At 4:15 PM, Lee Rankin of the Justice Department met with Seaton, followed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson, who filled in for the out-of-town Charles Wilson. Rankin and Anderson worked in Seaton’s office for nearly two hours on the official response. Aided by Colonel Charles W. Delanoy, Anderson met with Seaton the following morning to map out a strategy. At some point, Seaton assigned Colonel Jean Wood to collect all the materials accumulated by John Adams and others involved in dealing with the McCarthy case. Colonel Wood completed the task by 3:45 PM and brought all the materials to Seaton’s office which Seaton then hand-carried to the White House an hour later.

When John Adams returned to the Senate Caucus Room on Monday, he came armed not with the documents, but instead with the authorization to invoke executive privilege. Eisenhower claimed in his letter to the committee, “It is essential to the successful working of our system that the persons entrusted with power in any one of the three great branches of Government shall not encroach upon the authority confided to the others.” But Eisenhower was not finished. “The ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the Executive Branch rests with the President.” In case the Committee challenged the President’s directive, Adams was furnished with an Attorney General’s opinion dated March 2, written by Deputy Attorney General William Rogers, which outlined the legal precedent for Eisenhower’s claim, a claim that one scholar later argued was “altogether without historical foundation.”

Did Eisenhower make a mistake? Eisenhower realized after discussing the McCarthy problem with his senior staff and his close friends that something had to be done to protect executive branch officials from McCarthy’s wrath. More significant, it kept Sherman Adams, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Fred Seaton from ever testifying and revealing the extent of Eisenhower’s role in the affair. If they did appear, they would have had to explain not only the events surrounding the January 21 meeting as well as their authorization for the Army’s investigation of McCarthy that included the NSA’s eavesdropping and the CIA’s covert campaign to galvanize public opinion against McCarthy by funding scholars associated with Americans for Cultural Freedom such as James Rorty and Moshe Decter for their book *McCarthy and the Communists*. For Eisenhower, it would also have exposed the extent of his own reliance on other anti-McCarthy allies, such as Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont and Paul Hoffman, who had advised Eisenhower on executive privilege as well as providing anti-McCarthy information, some derived from the Army’s investigation. Such revelations would have strengthened McCarthy, reinforcing his main argument that the administration was weak, and would have increased McCarthy’s hold on a sizeable portion of the American public; his popularity stood at 50 percent according to a January 15, 1954, Gallup Poll.

**THE FRED FISCHER INCIDENT**

For the administration, the Army-McCarthy hearings were not concerned with the truth, but with weakening McCarthy’s political power. The “purloined letter” demonstrated that McCarthy sought access to classified information without authorization and encouraged public officials to break the law in the process. But the Fred Fisher incident on June 9 gave the viewing public the opportunity to view McCarthy’s abusive behavior, when he maliciously exposed Fred Fisher’s earlier association with the National Lawyers’ Guild, a Communist front organization. Shortly before the hearings began, Joseph Welch asked his team whether there was anything in their past that McCarthy could use against them. Fisher told Welch of his prior link to the National Lawyers Guild. Consequently, Welch thought it best to send Fisher back to Boston rather than expose him to McCarthy’s wrath. Now, live on television, the American public saw McCarthy at his bullying best, and they didn’t like what they saw. But while Joseph Welch’s outrage was actually staged, the incident should have been anticipated by the CIA’s psychological warfare team if they had profiled McCarthy. The CIA obviously knew McCarthy’s tendencies, especially his penchant to strike out blindly at a perceived slights and threats, as happened when Welch grilled Roy Cohn, allowing the audience in the Senate Caucus Room and those at home to see that indeed McCarthy “had no sense of decency.” The hearings did not prove fatal to McCarthy, but they had seriously weakened him, encouraging Eisenhower’s senatorial allies to press for his censure.
While grievously wounded by his encounter with Joseph Welch, McCarthy was not to be undone. He made another accusation on June 18, not concerning Communists in government, but a charge of improper influence by a Democratic Senator seeking a favorable outcome with another branch of government. As soon as McCarthy’s charge hit the morning Washington papers, Senator Lester Hunt of Wyoming left his home and drove to his Senate office and committed suicide with a .22 caliber rifle. Hunt’s colleagues claimed that Hunt’s suicide was connected to a recent illness that forced him not to seek re-election. Although the evidence was circumstantial, McCarthy and his allies apparently drove Hunt to suicide by threatening, if Hunt ran for re-election, to expose his son, who earlier was arrested for solicitation, as a homosexual. Hunt’s death was on the mind of many Republicans linked to the administration, none more so than Ralph Flanders.

**THE PROCESS OF CENSURING JOE McCARTHY**

Once again it was Eisenhower’s invisible hand coming into play as Senator Ralph Flanders introduced at the end of July of a motion to censure McCarthy. Flanders was a personal friend of Paul Hoffman, a noted McCarthy critic, who passed anti-McCarthy materials to the Vermont Senator which he used to challenge McCarthy. The fight moved to the Senate, McCarthy’s turf. The anti-McCarthy forces had to overcome the inertia of William Knowland, the GOP Senate majority leader, who sought to turn the whole matter over to a committee so the motion would die and a decision could be avoided. McCarthy, as he had done so many times in the past, and most recently during the Army-McCarthy hearings, reverted to a ploy that placed him at risk. During the debate over the Flanders’ proposal, McCarthy read into the record a letter of Harry Woodring, FDR’s former Secretary of War and former Kansas governor. By doing so, McCarthy revived his earlier attack on George Marshall, raising the question once again, “who lost China?” Knowland’s amendment, which turned the matter over to a committee, was now strengthened and required the select committee to issue a report and issue any necessary subpoenas before the Senate adjourned. In early August, Richard Nixon announced the Select Committee’s composition of three Republicans, Arthur Watkins of Utah, Frank Carlson of Kansas, and Francis Case of South Dakota, and three Democrats, Edwin Johnson of Colorado, John Stennis of Mississippi, and Sam Irvin of North Carolina.

Arthur Watkins was selected as chair, and eleven years after McCarthy’s death, Roy Cohn charged that Watkins railroaded McCarthy, claiming “the chairman himself would have been disqualified in a court of law as having indicated bias and prejudice against the defendant.” Watkins took exception and in his memoir, *Enough Rope*, responded to the charge that the McCarthy censure was the result of an Eisenhower plot. Watkins stressed, “This is simply not true,” and further wrote, “I can report authoritatively as anyone that President Eisenhower, as many then and since have commented, did indeed remain aloof from the McCarthy fracas.” Watkins sought to reinforce the claim that Eisenhower “did not discuss the matter with me, encourage me, or in any way indicate his ideas or preferences, before or during the censure proceedings.” Watkins was emphatic, but he was not truthful.

**AN “OFF THE RECORD” MEETING WITH ARTHUR WATKINS AND ROBERT STILLMORE**

On August 5, 1954, at 9:00 AM, Ann Watkins, the wife of the senator, phoned the White House and spoke with Tom Stephens, Eisenhower’s appointment secretary and presidential counselor. She informed Stephens that her husband would call shortly concerning a Robert Stillmore, a previously unknown figure in the Army-McCarthy affair, who earlier had met her husband at church. At 9:16 AM, Watkins made his call and arranged for a meeting with the President. At 10:43, Ann Watkins made a second call to confirm the meeting at 11:30 AM with Eisenhower. At precisely at 11:30, Watkins arrived with Stillmore. The meeting was to be off the record and was to last for only thirty minutes; however, it lasted much longer than anticipated as Eisenhower realized the gravity of the information provided by Stillmore. Watkins introduced his guest as a thirty-five-year-old who was formerly assigned to the Signals Intelligence Detachment. Quickly Eisenhower realized that Stillmore was the source of the “purloined letter” that began McCarthy’s foray into Fort Monmouth. Stillmore informed Eisenhower that he and fellow officers were concerned about the security situation at the Evans Signals Laboratory, and warned Eisenhower of “seeing secret documents that had ‘come out’ of Monmouth” as well as about “a man who ‘bragged’ that he was a communist,” and another who “sulked” whenever Stalin’s name was mentioned. According to Eisenhower’s secretary Ann Whitman, who took notes at the meeting, the President asked why Stillmore did not take this information to General Ridgway. Eisenhower must have been shocked when Stillmore responded, “Of course, I don’t believe he is personally a communist.” The President proceeded to defend Ridgway, citing his record and his heroism in the war. Stillmore continued and told Eisenhower how he was approached by a McCarthy staffer and was “‘treated fine’ by the McCarthy Committee,” and was so impressed that he passed classified information to the Wisconsin senator.

Watkins told Eisenhower that he “decided to bring the matter before the President because of his belief that this was not a subject for senatorial or congressional investigation.” Following the recently concluded Army-McCarthy hearings, Eisenhower no doubt “appreciated Senator Watkins having done this.” It would seem likely that both Watkins and
Eisenhower were troubled by Stillmore’s claim that “the CIA had a lot of these people [communists] in their organization.” Herbert Brownell, the Attorney General, arrived at the White House shortly after the meeting with Watkins and Stillmore, told the President that he would authorize an investigation into the release of “the FBI letter that figured so prominently in the recent hearings.” As soon as the meeting ended, Eisenhower met with General Ridgway and General Carroll, followed by another meeting with Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence.

The Watkins Committee was scheduled to bring their committee’s findings to the Senate by September 24, but Majority Leader Knowland delayed debate until after the elections on November 8. By then, however, the political landscape had drastically changed as the Democrats had regained both Houses of Congress. Initially, Lyndon Johnson, as the next Majority Leader, was content to allow the Republicans to handle McCarthy. Instead, McCarthy, with the help of L. Brent Bozell, who assisted McCarthy’s legal team, went on the attack and claimed that the Senate had fallen under communist influence. The debate in the Senate became so agitated that when McCarthy entered Bethesda Naval Hospital due to an alleged elbow injury, some thought this was a ploy to rally support. The Senate recessed until November 29. Those opposed to McCarthy viewed the delay as part of a campaign to mobilize outside pressure groups to intimidate the Senate. Others like Senators Everett Dirksen of Illinois and Styles Bridges of New Hampshire even sought a compromise solution, where McCarthy would apologize for his behavior. McCarthy would have none of it. Upon McCarthy’s return, the Senate on November 29 agreed to limit the debate to three days. Following the heated discussions on the Senate floor, the Senate dropped the charge of abusing General Zwicker. Finally, on December 2, 1954, the US Senate by a vote of 67 to 22 condemned, rather than censured, Joe McCarthy for his conduct.

It was snowing during the afternoon of December 2, when Fred Seaton and William H. Godel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, left the Pentagon for a 2:45 PM meeting with Allen Dulles at his Foggy Bottom office, not far from the State Department. The meeting lasted nearly three hours. Earlier in the day, the Senate had censured McCarthy, noting his conduct was “unbecoming a member of the United States Senate.” No records were kept of the meeting and the only available record comes from Seaton’s secretary, who kept detailed notes of Seaton’s comings and goings as well as visitors who stopped by his office. Researchers can only surmise the extent of their conversation; however, perhaps Dulles offered his guests drinks and well-deserved toasts for a job well done in handling McCarthy, not only as an impediment to the Eisenhower administration, but also a threat to the Agency itself, and for effectively reducing the national paranoia associated with McCarthyism.

Not long thereafter, Fred Seaton moved from his post in the Defense Department to the White House as Deputy Assistant to the President. Shortly before the 1956 election, Seaton was appointed as Secretary of the Interior and was responsible for adding both Hawaii and Alaska to the Union in 1959. Eisenhower awarded Fred Seaton the Medal of Freedom for his services to the nation. But just as Seaton was settling in as the new Interior Secretary, he received a cryptic letter from Drew Pearson inviting the Secretary and his wife to a private screening of “Storm Center,” concerning “civil liberties problems that churned up the Senate and State Department Libraries overseas not too long ago.” Pearson noted, “It’s going to arouse some vigorous reaction, and since I am sticking my neck out in its support I would appreciate it if you and Mrs. Seaton would join me in seeing whether I am wrong.” According to Seaton’s appointment book, he was free, but advised his staff to politely refuse. Professional and diplomatic alliances are transitory at best once their joint aims have been reached, especially when you are a cabinet member in the Eisenhower administration.

For Eisenhower the McCarthy problem was resolved, but it had been accomplished by what Fred Greenstein labeled “the hidden-hand.” However, could the President have followed a different course? Could he have taken the American people into his confidence and told them the truth about Communist subversion and the loyalty of government employees? Such a path would have been alien to Eisenhower’s leadership and personality style that he employed during World War II as Supreme Allied Commander as well as his belief in maintaining the nation’s secrets. Although the McCarthy dilemma had come to an end, the power of the imperial presidency and the national security state only grew exponentially following his presidency. Consequently, the Cold War had only enhanced national anxiety as it still does today, but now from a new and more nebulous threat posed by foreign terrorists. A lesson far too many Americans have long forgotten.

**Endnotes**

All of the primary sources used in the manuscript come directly from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library at Abilene, Kansas, especially from the Fred Seaton Papers, Ann Whiteman Files, and DDE Papers and Diary Series. Other sources, particularly, concerning G. David Schine were provided from the Federal Bureau of Investigation via a Freedom of Information Act Request. Unfortunately, the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency were less forthcoming when it came to fulfilling my FOIA inquiries.


22. Broadwater, Eisenhower, 138; The Loyalty Review Board was the outgrowth of Harry Truman’s Loyalty Program created by Executive Order 9835 on March 22, 1947. The purpose was to deny employment to federal employees deemed to be communists.

23. Telephone call, Stevens to Cohn, 21 October 1953, Telephone Call Notes, October – November 1953, box 9, FAS Eyes Only Series, McCarthy Subseries, Fred A. Seaton Papers.


25. Fred Seaton was assigned to bring order to Charlie Wilson’s press conferences as Secretary of Defense. According to William H. Godel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, who worked closely with Fred Seaton, the Eisenhower administration had no intention of permitting Reichelderfer to ever appear before McCarthy, telephone conversation with the author, March 10, 1999.


27. “Foreign Reactions to Administration Policies,” NSC Series, box 4, folder: 153rd Meeting of the NSC, July 9, 1953, Ann Whitman Files; Telephone calls for November 17 and November 18, Appointment Book Series, box 5, folder: Telephone Call Notes November 1954, Fred A. Seaton Papers; Appointment Book Entry for November 19, 1954, Appointment Book Series, box 1, folder Appointment Book for 1954, Fred A. Seaton Papers. In July 1953, McCarthy used a former OSS officer, Ulius Amoss, to discover incriminating information on employees of the CIA. McCarthy’s first salvo in his attack on Dulles was the revelations concerning William Bundy, who worked on the CIA’s Board of National Estimates. When this allegation was made, Allen Dulles went to the White House and informed Eisenhower he, Allen Dulles, would resign if McCarthy’s foray continued. See Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: New Press, 1999), 209.
29. John Adams dictation of 1-28-54, tape 1, Fred Seaton, Sensitive Files Series, Chronological Copies of Memos Sent to the Secretary of the Army’s Office, Fred Seaton Papers.
33. John Adams dictation of 1-28-54, tape 4, Fred Seaton, Sensitive Files Series, Chronological Copies of Memos Sent to the Secretary of the Army’s Office, Fred Seaton Papers.
34. John Adams dictation of 1-28-54, tape 5, Fred Seaton, Sensitive Files Series, Chronological Copies of Memos Sent to the Secretary of the Army’s Office, Fred Seaton Papers; Adams, Without Precedent, 110-111.
35. Meeting, LTG Ralph Canine and Sidney Smith, Monday, February 1, 1954, box 1, folder: Appointment Book Series, Fred Seaton Papers; James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on the NSA, America’s Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 113. This was not the only meeting between Canine and Seaton, on January 6 and January 7, 1954, Canine repeatedly called Seaton concerning an urgent matter that only Seaton could handle. See, “Telephone entry January 6 and January 7, 1954,” box 5, folder: Telephone Notes January 1954, Appointment Book Series, Fred A. Seaton Papers. Bamford appeared not to be aware of McCarthy’s effort to seek information from General Henry Reichelderfer, who had knowledge of VENONA, the NSA’s effort to break Soviet secret intelligence communications.
36. Telephone Conversation between Robert Stevens and Fred Seaton, January 8, 1953, Eyes Only Series, McCarthy Subseries, box 5, folder: Transcripts – Jack Lucas, Fred Seaton Papers. At the time, Schine was a basic trainee and had yet obtained a military occupational specialty (MOS). When he did, it was with the military police (MP), doing advanced individual training (AIT) at Fort Gordon, GA.
40. Oshinsky, Conspiracy So Immense, 368-371; Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, 5 February 1954, Eyes Only Series, box 6, folder: [Contents of Specific Developments from John Adams to FAS April 15, 1954], Fred A. Seaton Papers. For material on the case of Annie Lee Moss, who was a member of the CPUSA for a very brief time, see Andrea Friedman, “The Strange Career of Annie Lee Moss: Rethinking Race, Gender, and McCarthyism,” The Journal of American History 94, no. 2 (September 2007): 445-468.
41. Those ordered to be removed from the hearing included John Adams; Colonel Brown, G-2 at Camp Kilmer; and Captain William Woodward, a medical officer. McCarthy quoted in Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 377.
43. Oshinsky, Conspiracy So Immense, 384-387.
51. Memorandum, Evans to Rose, March 24, 1954, G. David Schine File, FBI File No. 62-HQ-98588. This material was provided from the FBI as a result of a Freedom of Information request.
52. Telephone Notes, March 15, 1954, Appointment Book Series, box 5, folder Telephone Notes March 1954, Fred A. Seaton Papers; “Telephone call from Drew Pearson’s Office to Secretary of the Army,” February 24, 1954 at 12:15 p.m., Eyes Only Series, Miscellaneous Subseries, box 9, folder: Telephone Notes – Secretary of the Army (17), Fred A. Seaton Papers; Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, February 24, 1954, Eyes Only Series, Miscellaneous Subseries, box 8, folder: Office Memos from Jack Lucas to Secretary of the Army (34), Fred A. Seaton Papers; Pilat, Drew Pearson, 29-31.

53. Drew Pearson began his diary entry for January 1, 1949 with this entry: “Mr. Karr [David Karr, chief leg man on the staff] insists I keep a diary,” Abell, ed., Drew Pearson Diaries 1949-1959, 3; For David Karr, see John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 245-247; Yevgenia Albats, The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia – Past, Present and Future (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994), 250. VENONA was a highly secret cryptographic effort started on February 1, 1943 by the U.S. Army’s Signal Intelligence Service, the precursor to the National Security Agency. The objective was to break Soviet diplomatic cable traffic, including Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) and NKVD traffic as well. The program was highly classified and ceased operations on October 1, 1980. David C. Martin, a reporter for CBS, first reported about VENONA, without mentioning its name in his Wilderness of Mirrors published in 1980. VENONA demonstrated that Soviet intelligence had penetrated the Manhattan Project and information derived from VENONA led to the arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Robert J. Lamphere, the FBI liaison to the VENONA, also worked closely with Roy Cohn during the Rosenberg trial. For more information, see Robert J. Lamphere with Tom Shachtman, The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent’s Story (New York: Random House, 1986), 209-210, 212, 215, 219.

54. “Telephone Call to William Rogers, March 2, 1954, DDE Diary Series, box 5, folder: Phone Calls – January-May 1954 (2), Ann Whitman Files; “Power and Authority of the President of the United States to Withhold Information Relating to the Executive Branch of Government from Congressional Committees,” Administrative Series, box 8, folder: Brownell, Herbert Jr., 1952-54 (3). This call may have been initiated as a result of meetings between Paul Hoffman and the President, who followed up with a letter later in the month as evident in note 55.


57. Ewald, Who Killed Joe McCarthy?, 297-299.


59. Telephone call, Welch to Stevens, April 16, 1954, at 12:37 p.m.; Telephone call, Robert Stevens to Fred Seaton, April 21, 1954, at 2:29 p.m., Eyes Only Series, McCarthy Subseries, box 9, folder: Telephone Notes – Secretary of the Army (21), Fred A. Seaton Papers.


70. Robert Shogan, No Sense of Decency: The Army-McCarthy Hearings (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2009), 235-240; Rodger McDaniel, Dying for McCarthy's Sins: The Suicide of Wyoming Senator Lester Hunt (Cody, WY: WordsWorth, 2013), 244-303; The tragedy of Lester Hunt’s suicide was
a component of the Lavender Scare and an clear example of lavender-baiting that occurred during the McCarthy period. For more information on how lavender-baiting was applied by McCarthy, see the declassified Executive Sessions of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Operations, Volumes 1-5, 83d Congress, 1953-1954, made available in 2003 as well as Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), 97-167.


75. Diary Entry August 5, 1954, DDE Diary Series, box 4, folder: DDE Personal Diary Jan-Nov 1954, Ann Whitman Files. The “purloined letter” was presented as evidence during the Army-McCarthy hearings on May 5, 1954, which provided McCarthy with the authority to investigate Fort Monmouth. The document in question was produced by the FBI, but Joseph Welch demanded how McCarthy obtained the document’s possession. McCarthy admitted that it came from the Army, but did not offer to identify his source. See Arthur Herman, Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated Senator (New York: Free Press, 2000), 267-268.

76. Ibid.

77. The President’s Appointments, Thursday, August 5, 1954, President’s Appointment Book.


79. Senate Resolution 301, December 2, 1954; SEN 83A-B4, Records of the United States Senate; Record Group 46; National Archives.


81. Letter, Drew Pearson to Fred Seaton, June 14, 1956, Personal Correspondence Series, box 21, folder PEA-PEH (2), Fred A. Seaton Papers.

APPENDIX ONE: DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Adams, John – General Counsel for the U.S. Army during the first Eisenhower administration. He was appointed liaison to Senator Joseph McCarthy by Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens. He created a detailed account of McCarthy’s bullying of the Army that culminated in the Army-McCarthy hearings.

Adams, Sherman – Former Governor of New Hampshire and President Eisenhower’s Chief-of-Staff from 1953 to 1958. He encouraged John Adams to compose the Adams chronology. Later, he was forced to resign after he received gifts from a personal friend, while interceding on his behalf with a Federal regulatory agency.

Brownell, Herbert – Directed the Eisenhower 1952 campaign and later served as Eisenhower’s Attorney General. He became a liability for Eisenhower during his second term, because he helped select Earl Warren to be Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and was the President’s point man during the Civil Rights crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas.

Canine, Ralph – Lieutenant general in the U.S. Army and first Director of the National Security Agency. He was appointed in 1952 and served in that capacity until 1956.

Carlson, Frank – Former Congressman, Governor, and Senator from Kansas. He helped convince Eisenhower to run in 1952 and was selected to serve on the Senate Select Committee to Censure Joe McCarthy in 1954. Unlike his Kansas colleague in the Senate, Andrew F. Schoeppel, Carlson stood his ground despite the pro-McCarthy support from many of his constituents.
Clarke, Carter Weldon – Brigadier general in the U.S. Army who spent most of his career in military intelligence. In 1943 he started the VENONA Project to decipher Soviet diplomatic and intelligence codes, which continued until 1985. He was conservative and believed the Democrats and Harry Truman were security risks. According to the late U.S. Senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Clarke recommended to the FBI that they withhold VENONA-related information from Harry Truman. Drew Pearson, a popular political pundit, believed that Clarke was Joe McCarthy’s secret source about Communists in the U.S. government.

Cohn, Roy – As a young prosecutor, he worked on the Rosenberg and William Remington spy cases. His role in those proceedings, and his efforts to bring charges against Owen D. Lattimore, a China expert and a Professor at Johns Hopkins, gained the attention of Senator Joseph McCarthy, who hired him to serve as chief counsel for McCarthy’s Permanent Investigation Subcommittee. Cohn’s relationship to an unpaid staffer, G. David Schine, contributed to the Army-McCarthy hearings.

Coleman, Aaron – A radar scientist who had worked at Fort Monmouth, NJ for fifteen years. He was the first of 42 technicians at Fort Monmouth to be suspended as a security risk. He knew both Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell, a member of the Rosenberg spy network, but whether he was an actual communist agent has never been verified.

Dulles, Allen – Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from 1953 to 1961 and the brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He was concerned about the damage that McCarthy was causing within the CIA and the federal government.

Fisher, Fred – A lawyer who worked at Hale and Dorr in Boston. Initially, he was assigned to be part of the team defending the U.S. Army during the Army-McCarthy hearings, but was removed for his earlier membership in the National Lawyers’ Guild, a communist front organization. McCarthy’s outburst attacking Fisher’s reputation prompted Joseph Welch to respond, “Senator, have you no sense of decency?”

Flanders, Ralph – U.S. Senator from Vermont who served in the Senate from 1946 to 1958. He was one of the first Senators to openly attack McCarthy on March 9, 1954, as well as introduce the resolution to censure McCarthy. He was a personal friend of Paul Hoffman.

Godel, William H. – A well-respected intelligence operative who worked closely with the intelligence establishment and held similar postings in the Department of Defense. During the first Eisenhower administration he was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and worked closely with Fred Seaton in dealing with McCarthy.

Helms, Paul – A California baking executive and confidant of President Eisenhower.


Hoffman, Paul – A former automobile executive, Marshall Plan administrator, President of the Ford Foundation and Fund for the Republic. He advised Eisenhower on how to respond to McCarthy as well as providing anti-McCarthy foes derogatory information about the Wisconsin Senator.

Hunt, Lester – Democratic Senator from Wyoming, whom McCarthy and his allies pressured to announce his decision not to run for re-election in 1954. In order to deflect from McCarthy’s shortcomings during the Army-McCarthy hearings, McCarthy threatened to name Hunt’s son as a homosexual. When the news hit the morning Washington papers of McCarthy’s intentions, Hunt committed suicide in his Senate office.

Knowland, William – Republican Senator from California and Senate Majority Leader.

Lodge, Henry Cabot – Former Senator from Massachusetts, who was defeated by John F. Kennedy in 1952. During the Eisenhower administration, he served as U.S. UN Ambassador. He met with John Adams, Sherman Adams, and Hebert Brownell to devise a plan to counter Joe McCarthy’s attacks on the U.S. Army in January 1954. Later, he was Richard Nixon’s running mate in 1960.

McCarthy, Joseph R. Jr. – Junior Senator from Wisconsin. He defeated legendary Republican Senator Robert La Follette Jr. in the 1946 Republican Primary and went on to win the general election. He drew the attention of conservatives in 1949 when he challenged the U.S. Army’s handling of the trial of SS personnel for their role in the Malmedy Massacre during the Battle of the Bulge. Later, he claimed that there were 205 Communists working in the U.S. State Department in Wheeling, West Virginia in February 1950. When the Republicans regained control of the Senate after the 1952 election, he was made Chair of the Senate Permanent Committee on Investigations.

Marshall, George C. – Chief-of-Staff of the U.S. Army during World War II. After the war, Harry Truman appointed Marshall Secretary of State, where he went on to propose the Marshall Plan. Later, he served in the Truman administration as Secretary of Defense during the Korean War. McCarthy blamed Marshall for the fall of China in 1949.

Mundt, Karl – U.S. Senator from South Dakota from 1948 to 1973. He was a major McCarthy ally in the U.S. Senate.

Pearson, Drew – A leading American columnist and political gadfly best remembered for his column, the “Washington Merry-Go-Round.” He was a major McCarthy critic and provided derogatory information concerning McCarthy to the Senator’s opponents.

Peress, Irving – A New York dentist who was drafted into the U.S. Army during the Korean War. McCarthy was made aware of Peress’s political affiliation and during a subcommittee hearing asked, “Who promoted Peress?”


Rosenberg, Julius – Soviet spy executed in 1953 for passing atomic secrets to the Russians. His wife Ethel was also executed, though she was innocent of the charges.

St. Clair, James – Deputy to Joseph Welch in defending the Army during the Army-McCarthy Hearings. Later, he would defend Richard Nixon during the Watergate scandal.

Seaton, Fred – Leading Kansas and Nebraska newspaper man as well as a long-time Republican operative and Eisenhower loyalist. In the fall of 1953 he was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense and served in that capacity during the McCarthy affair. Later, he was appointed Secretary of the Interior during Eisenhower’s second term.

Schine, G. David – An unpaid staffer on the McCarthy Subcommittee. Schine’s draft status, and the efforts to procure a commission for Schine, prompted the Army-McCarthy Hearings.

Stevens, Robert – A textile executive from New Jersey appointed by Dwight Eisenhower to serve as Secretary of the Army during the Fort Monmouth investigation and the Army-McCarthy Hearings.

Stillmore, Robert – A security officer who served at Fort Monmouth and passed critical information to McCarthy concerning lax security at the Evans Laboratory at the Army Signal Center at Fort Monmouth.

VENONA – The code name for a highly classified decryption effort to break Soviet diplomatic and intelligence codes that started in 1943 and ended in 1985. VENONA was made public in 1995.

Watkins, Arthur – Senator from Utah who was elected in 1946 and served until 1959. Scholars believe his defeat was related to his Chairmanship of the Senate Select Committee to investigate Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and McCarthy’s subsequent condemnation on December 2, 1954.

Welch, Joseph N. – Army Chief Counsel during the Army-McCarthy hearings. Later, because of his fame during the hearings, Otto Preminger used him in 1959 to play the Michigan judge in Preminger’s classic film, Anatomy of a Murder.

Zwicker, Ralph – Commanding officer at Camp Kilmer, the army base where Irving Peress, the communist dentist, was posted. During the course of a hearing, McCarthy went on to belittle Zwicker after he refused to tell McCarthy who promoted the dentist.

APPENDIX TWO: CHRONOLOGICAL TIMELINE FOR “ON THE SIDE OF ANGELS AND THE FALL OF JOE MCCARTHY”

April-September 1949 – Senate Armed Services Subcommittee begins hearings of the U.S. Army’s handling, after the war, of German SS officers and enlisted men involved in the Malmedy Massacre of American soldiers during the Battle of the Bulge. Joe McCarthy participated in the hearings, challenging the Army’s accounts of the war crimes trials.

November 25-27, 1949 – Roy Cohn claimed in his biography of Joe McCarthy that McCarthy was visited by an officer or officers from military intelligence who gave him information detailing Communist penetration of the U.S. Government.

January 7, 1950 – Drew Pearson in his column, Washington Merry-Go-Round, detailed the meeting that Joe McCarthy had with Father Edmund Walsh; Drew Pearson’s lawyer, William A. Roberts; and Charles Kraus, a political science professor at Georgetown University, at the Colony Restaurant. and discussed whether to use Communists in the Truman administration as a campaign issue when seeking re-election in 1952.

February 9, 1950 – McCarthy made a speech at the Ohio County Women’s Republican Club in Wheeling, West Virginia, claiming that there were 205 Communists in the State Department.

December 12, 1950 – Joe McCarthy had a physical altercation with the columnist Drew Pearson at the Sulgrave Club in Washington, D.C. Richard Nixon intervened to stop McCarthy’s assault of the columnist.

January 29, 1951 – McCarthy visited Topeka, Kansas for the annual Republican Lincoln Day Dinner and claimed that Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, held a “Svengali [-like] influence over Truman.”

June 14, 1951 – McCarthy on the floor of the U.S. Senate attacked former Army Chief of Staff and former Secretary of State George Marshall for being part of the worldwide communist conspiracy.

October 2, 1952 – Dwight Eisenhower, on a planned Wisconsin visit during his presidential campaign, was determined to challenge McCarthy for his attack on George Marshall. Wisconsin Republican officials, along with Joe McCarthy, met Eisenhower’s train in Peoria, Illinois and advised him not to openly attack McCarthy for political reasons. Later, Eisenhower said, “You won’t get me in the gutter with that guy.”


July 17, 1953 – Drew Pearson reported on G. David Schine’s draft avoidance while serving on the McCarthy Committee.

Mid-July 1953 – Joe McCarthy and Roy Cohn make a
concerted effort to seek a commission for G. David Schine to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as a posting to the Central Intelligence Agency.

**August 31, 1953** – McCarthy began the Fort Monmouth Hearings, involving alleged Communist penetration of the Signal Corps Laboratory located there.

**September 15, 1953** – Fred Seaton was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and Legislation.

**October 21, 1953** – Roy Cohn, Chief Counsel for Joe McCarthy’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, called John Adams, Counsel for the U.S. Army, and notified Adams that McCarthy planned on calling Major General Henry Reichelderfer to appear before his committee.

**November 3, 1953** – G. David Schine was inducted into the U.S. Army and eventually assigned to Fort Dix, New Jersey for Basic Training.

**December 22, 1953** – Drew Pearson told his readers of the special perks G. David Schine received at Fort Dix and his trips to New York City.

**January 17, 1954** – Frank Carr, a McCarthy staffer, notified John Adams that McCarthy wanted several members of the loyal-security appeals board to appear before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, including Major General Henry Reichelderfer.


**January 29, 1954** – Army authorities were prepared to release an investigation into G. David Schine’s special privileges at Fort Dix, New Jersey.

**January 30, 1954** – McCarthy interrogated Major Irving Peress, a dentist at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, who happened to be a member of the Communist Party, leading McCarthy to demand: “Who promoted Peress?” Peress later sought an immediate discharge, effective February 1, 1954.

**February 1, 1954** – General Ralph Canine, the Director of the National Security Agency, met with Fred Seaton to vacate the office of general counsel to the NSA. Later, NSA couriers were sent to Seaton’s office on a periodic basis.

**February 18, 1954** – During a hearing, McCarthy called Brigadier General Ralph Zwicker, the commanding general at Camp Kilmer, to appear. Zwicker was ordered not to name the names of those who promoted Irving Peress. Before the hearing, McCarthy had John Adams and supporting officers removed from the room.

**February 23, 1954** – Vice President Richard Nixon arranged for a meeting between McCarthy and Robert Stevens, Secretary of the Army, to resolve the issue of Peress’ promotion during a “Chicken Luncheon.” Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota, a McCarthy ally, then met with the press and claimed that Secretary Stevens had agreed to provide McCarthy with all the names of those responsible for the promotion of Irving Peress.

**February 24, 1954** – Drew Pearson first contacted Fred Seaton’s Pentagon office and offered to help with McCarthy.

**March 2, 1954** – Eisenhower called Herbert Brownell, but since Brownell was unavailable, Eisenhower spoke with William Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, and inquired whether the executive branch had the authority to keep someone from testifying before a Congressional Committee.

**March 3, 1954** – Rodgers sent the President a twenty-four-page report detailing the President’s authority in withholding information from Congressional Committees.

**March 6, 1954** – Former presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson claimed that Eisenhower and his administration used McCarthyism for partisan political reasons. Stevenson’s assertion led McCarthy for equal time on national radio networks to respond, but Eisenhower directed Len Hall, Chairman of the Republican Party, to have Richard Nixon respond on March 9, 1954.

**March 9, 1954** – Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont, an Eisenhower ally, took to the Senate floor and charged McCarthy with weakening the United States in the struggle with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

**March 11, 1954** – The Pentagon released the Adams chronology to the press.

**March 15, 1954** – Fred Seaton called Drew Pearson at 8:30 p.m., and discussed McCarthy for more than an hour.

**March 25, 1954** – Paul Hoffman sent a letter to Eisenhower detailing how the President could keep executive branch officials from appearing before a Congressional Committee. Eisenhower was impressed and forwarded the letter with an accompanying memorandum to Herbert Brownell, the Attorney General.

**April 2, 1954** – The Army hired Joseph N. Welch of the Hale and Dorr Law Firm to represent the Army in the upcoming Army-McCarthy Hearings.

**April 22, 1954** – The start of the Army-McCarthy Hearings.

**May 12-14, 1954** – John Adams testified during the Army-McCarthy Hearings and revealed the secret January 21, 1954, meeting with Sherman Adams, Herbert Brownell, and Henry Cabot Lodge. Adams was directed by the Committee to return on Monday, May 17 with all relevant documents. Instead, he returned with a presidential directive claiming executive privilege.

**July 9, 1954** – McCarthy, following the questioning of Roy Cohn, asked for a “point of order,” to openly attack Fred Fisher, a lawyer of the Hale and Dorr Law Firm who was not assigned to Joseph Welch’s team during the Army-McCarthy Hearings. Welch proceeded to ask for silence and then made the statement: “Have you no sense of decency, sir?”
July 30, 1954 – Senator Ralph Flanders introduced a resolution to censure Joe McCarthy.

August 2, 1954 – The resolution for censure was sent to a bipartisan committee of three Republicans and three Democrats to investigate all the allegations and report back to the Senate by November 8, 1954.

August 5, 1954 – The names of the select committee, known as the Watkin’s Committee, were released, with Arthur Watkins selected as Chairman. Earlier, Watkins had introduced Robert Stillmore, a former security official at Fort Monmouth, to Eisenhower as the source of the “purloined letter,” which had instigated the Fort Monmouth investigation.

November 8, 1954 – The Watkin’s Committee released to the Senate its findings concerning the censure of Joe McCarthy, commencing a debate over the charges.

December 2, 1954 – By a vote of 67 to 22, the Senate censured [condemned] Joe McCarthy. Later in the day, Fred Seaton and William H. Godel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, visited Allen Dulles at CIA headquarters at Foggy Bottom, in Washington, D.C.

May 2, 1957 – Senator Joseph R. McCarthy at the age of 49 died at Bethesda Naval Hospital.

APPENDIX THREE: PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS


President Eisenhower presents the Father Of The Year medal to Paul G. Hoffman. There ceremony was witnessed by Mamie Eisenhower in the President’s Office in the White House. June 17, 1954. Copyright unknown.


President Eisenhower receives Senator Ralph Flanders who presented him with an invitation to attend the Annual Spring Meeting of Mechanical Engineers. The meeting took place in the President’s White House office. January 10, 1955. National Park Service.